| This page is a summary of discussions between Stephen Paul King [SPK]
(see the URL of his website below) and myself [RYG] on the philosophical
aspect - and some theoretical aspects - of the thesis presented on this
site. It provides an in-depth analysis of the thrust of this thesis,
showing that, beyond the presented technical hypotheses and proposed
experimental verifications, it goes against the main trend of 20th century
Scientific philosophy, to the point of questioning the future of Science
if that trend continues. It is one of the goals of this thesis to help
redress this trend for the sake of Science's future. Many appear to
confuse not following a philosophical trend with being in scientific
error, thereby confusing a philosophical view with scientific
correctness/truth or the opposite. These same people feel that the
Scientific Method is not important to fully follow in order to find the
right from the wrong, and instead look for "confirmation" of their views
merely by having others share them, or by finding a way to publish them.
Being part of a group or organization is important to them for that
reason. This is of course not the way of Science. This page can be
considered as a new appendix for the conclusion section of phase 2.
Introduction |
| Introduction
[SPK} I found your page while looking for an on-line paper by Lee Smolin. I must say that I found your ideas to be very interesting. I have been pursuing a similar line of thinking myself and would like to discuss some of your ideas with you. My main area of interest is the nature of Time and am involved in a collaboration with Prof. Hitoshi Kitada and Lance Fletcher. See my web page for more info: http://members.home.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html [RYG] I am glad you found some resonance with your ideas at my site. My ideas are not easy to grasp. Too many sophisms have been invented in the past centuries to see Reality for what it is without a lot of hard work to get rid of them all. I believe experiments can only open the eyes of people at this point, and this includes faculty. In general I want to break the mold... and paper publication is not enough to do that. I also need a mathematician who has enough fresh imagination to at last go beyond our present mathematics which is still tied to Classical Physics (see my math page)... Riemann is no longer around, unfortunately. I have written my study over a period of 7 years, I describe how it came about in my "history" page, so I won't repeat this here. I looked at your site and some of the papers you have there. I cannot put out a judgement from this very cursory look. I'll try to look at it further later. But I have felt to be a kind of "dissident among dissidents" along the year of my posting on the web because I have attempted to put out something falsifiable, and all with whom I discussed weren't. Usually dissidents don't want to stick their neck out and put themselves in the position to be proven wrong... [SPK] Resonance indeed! My own ideas are very difficult to grasp as to understand them requires a mental image of how all the "parts" interleave and support each other. I have found that in discussing ideas we must break our ideas into "easy pieces" and try to get the others to both understand that piece and how it relates to all the others. We can see an illustration of such when consider how a couple of people could communicate with each other when each one of them is thinking using different paradigms. |
| Paradigms vs. Sophisms
[RYG] I go more on finding the whole from the details. I am not an analyzer, I am a synthesizer. Van Gogh described his state of mind via whole pictures. Taking details of his work destroys the work. In my case I defend what I see in astrophysics by consequences in microbiology. If the whole is missed nothing is accomplished. Another correspondent debates EPR results but fails to see consequences of the whole giving EPR on one side and ignores other areas of our knowledge, which may be a lot less debatable. This is where also I may be a lot less understandable. But I don't see any way out of that. Our imagination must expand from gathering known data, not be reduced to details. The details only come when it is time to finalize the work: the experiments. But that part is critical. I have attempted a break of my work into "easy pieces" with others before. The problem I have faced was that my worldview is very deep so that in effect a correspondent not having read my work will misunderstand the pieces by seeing them out of context. My study includes (conclusion of phase 2) a critique of Kuhn and his "paradigm" idea [1]. From other sources I know that the idea of "paradigms" has been heavily criticized well before me for years. There is much more than paradigms at work in Science, and Kuhn used this way to put down Science to describe it as a set of paradigms. I use instead the term of "sophism" as Dennett has used [2] and it makes for me a lot more sense. It appears also much more meaningful to describe the history of Science. What I deal with then is bringing out the undercurrent of Science in the past centuries as a series/set of sophisms, defined as "as if" statements with a *potential* to be fallacious, not necessarily fallacious. Space was seen by Newton *as if* it was an arena. This sophism was trashed by Einstein through seeing space as affected by its content, but early in his scientific career he maintained gravitation as a field. Only at the end he had doubts about this "field" idea. [SPK] We could think of the "sophisms" that have been invented as individual aspect of a paradigm that has allowed for an approximate understanding of our world, but as we can easily see any model we might develop of the world will always be "incomplete" (in the Goedelian sense). [RYG] Sophisms are different from paradigms. Paradigms in Kuhn's understanding are "examplars" of an understanding, small ways to tackle specific problems. Sophisms are "as if's," such as Dennett's Intentional Stance or Schroedinger/Born Statistical Stance. They cover an entire worldview. They are much more powerful than paradigms, but they are also much more dangerous in the road to finding the truth, by potentially hiding it through a false understanding. I throw out the old sophisms to bring out a better one. This has been the story of Science. Faraday did not make a model when he saw lines of force. It was a worldwide approach about treating electricity. That approach was addressing how to deal with observed facts about electrical phenomena in a meaningful way, *in a way we could understand*. The notion of field was a sophism because this view entailed that the lines of forces were playing in an arena, space, disconnected from it, it was potentially fallacious (not only incomplete, but plain wrong). This view was different from a model: We may not understand a model (as an "examplar" per Kuhn), but a model may be able to be predictive, so it is a scientific paradigm. Models/paradigms do not necessarily help us understand, they are there to give us a method to formalize the phenomenon or predict it, a very short-sighted goal, supposedly to make Science "efficient," but this is part of a doctrine to put down Science as being incapable of finding an objective truth from Nature, the same approach Galileo's pope used against Science [3]. Through Kuhn (following others well before him - he only represented a trend) the 20th century has experienced a Scientific Counter Revolution (at least in the Physical Sciences - which are the source of our progress) back to Middle-Ages' ways of "discussing" the World instead of doing real Science, and I address this sad fact in my work. [This matter will come back again and again in the discussion here] |
| Separability via Bounded CSM's
[SPK] I have been reading your phase 1 and I stumbled over your notion of a "Common Space Manifold" (CSM). It is defined as being [paraphrasing] 'one set of connections making up all the realities of other manifolds connections.' (pg. 18) My problem is that since we have rejected the Axiom of Choice, how are we to have any consistent way to define the CSM as "different" in its properties from all other manifolds of monadic relations? Do you see what I mean or am I missing something? [RYG] The only thing you are missing is that I do not claim this feature to be based so far on an established logic. This is a very important question because it hits on one of the parts of the process leading ultimately to a separable world as I describe later on. The other key question (antecedent to this one) is why would unseparable relations gather into manifolds, either bounded or unbounded to give the various quanta we find through experiments? These questions are hypotheses in my study as I did not have the logic to back it up, it was purely based on a physical hunch (as Einstein's warping of space initially was). In the math page I identify these features as a needed output of a non-Cantorian set theory yet to be laid out. [SPK] (Continued from above) This is an issue that I have wrestled with for a long time in my own thinking. I think that a solution to this issue can be found by noticing that the way that the "assemblies of monadic spaces" relate to each other could be used to reconstruct the "appearance" of a CSM but such would not be "one" such CSM but an "image" of a CSM within each assembly itself. It is more like an algebraic identity (actually, it is a "greatest fixed point") than as a unique "set". This is a subtle notion that will take a bit of explanation but I think that you are already far ahead of most people in your intuition about this stuff. :-) [RYG] The common feature must come from a consistency requirement of the overall computation. Building an identity in each content manifold would not bring such. [SPK] Perhaps we need to take a close look at how consistency itself is definable! I first came to my way of thinking by reading Weyl's Space, Time, Matter book [4] p.122, 124, 135, 136 and considering his argument that the scale/gauge of a particle must be such that it is defined locally and cannot be given by a "global decree". I was strongly reminded of this when reading your bit about the Paradox of the Stadium! [Hint: What role does the Row A play in defining the "shortest possible time"? Answer: It defines the "unit distance." ... ;-) ] [RYG] I do describe in the particle physics area (phase 1) that the scale of quanta vs. the CSM results from a computation for each structure, thus "local" in a sense. This still does not explain the appearance of the CSM. The interactive computation concept we discuss below may give the start of an answer. [SPK] (Quoting Paul Auster) "In the same way, the world is not the sum of all things that are in it. It is the infinitely complex network of connections among them. As in the meaning of words, things take on meaning only in relationship to each other."[RYG] Wow! I would add that things then *may* take on "identity"... but only under certain conditions... [SPK] Yes, and it is these "conditions" that are the the local "contexts of individual observations..." [RYG] This is your view. My view is that, in order to have "local" features, a "landscape" in the CSM must appear, an "objective" feature which does not require "observers." I advance in my study that this feature can occur only with bounded CSM's (nuclei of atoms) within the CSM itself. The conditions for identities/separability to appear is then for such bounded manifolds to occur. What is known as "quantum decoherence" (and the appearance of the Classical World - a subject formally addressed by Zurek and others as I address in my study) comes from the existence of atoms. The leptonic space I envision does not include such bounded structures, and unseparability (quantum coherence) is thereby maintained in that kind of space. This is a key feature that I claim to exist in living materials and can explain the existence of "Quantum Observers" as I develop in phase 2, an existence you will take as your theoretical basis for quantum decoherence (the Classical World)! (see later) In effect you will then deny that the Classical World has an objective existence as Bohr denied that the Quantum World exists! You will take both worlds as a figment of the imagination of each observer, and will then try to find why there is a commonality between these figments of imagination...of course unsuccessfully. This will show your very closeness to Bohr and Galileo's pope on a philosophical basis, an attitude I perceive as a regression to Middle-Age Scholar thinking, before the Scientific Revolution! It is sad to see how pervasive such an attitude is these days, an attitude that took decades to triumph, and I feebly attempt to redress the situation with my work for the sake of the future of Science. |
| The Applicability of Interactive Computation to
Physics (Peter Wegner's Work)
[SPK] There seems to be some things about computational theory that you
might wish to take a look at. Please read the following paper from Peter
Wegner: [RYG] Reading Peter Wegner's paper, I am stunned to see so many "resonant" points with my theory. I am trying to find out whether the Not-So-Well-Formed Set Theory could be tweaked to cover unseparable/ undistinguishable sets (apparently Wegner has not made the leap yet to an unseparable world since he still deals with our good old computers!). I may be talking of the same set theory in my math page at the site! [SPK] I believe you are -talking about the same set theory-! [RYG] ...I finished reading Wegner's paper, so I can be now more explicit. Toward the end he tries to relate interactive computing theory to quantum physics. My opinion is that his argumentation is limited there because of two facts: (1) He takes quantum nondeterminism as the only feature that differentiates the quantum from the classical world, he misses the main point of EPR, which identifies the profoundly non-local makeup of the quantum. Einstein not only questioned QT because of its nondeterminism (via "God does not play with dice") but also because he thought QT was missing the local aspect of our world (via EPR). In fact EPR experiments are the only experiments that have no explanation via semiclassical theories (per Clauser 1972). Non-determinism is really not the novelty of the quantum vs. classical thoughts. (2) He ignores the creative and holistic phenomena displayed by Life. These phenomena have been wishfully denied by Artificial Life researchers *in spite of the evidence* (Sheldrake's clumsy approach is a rebellion against that) because they can't see Life more than a classical phenomenon due to the present limited view of QT. Only experiments at the microbiological level can put this question to rest by showing Life as not only a holistic system (which may be somewhat explained in a classical way) but in a larger-defined quantum way leading to creativity. Classical computation cannot reach that feature, nor can QCs. Wegner believes that his extended Turing test using distributed systems will make our computers "lifelike," I don't (he answers Penrose there - I do too in my phase 2 but more efficiently, I believe). For me this is wishful. Creativity will still be missing. I understand that many believe Wegner's stance. That's why my physical analysis of Life is important in phase 2 for my overall thesis - including phase 1. I believe that, in a physical manner, my theory fills the gap Wegner left open in the correspondence computation-Reality by providing a model of computation using not only geometrical terms (manifolds, dimensionality, directed graphs, etc.) but also by discarding the axiom of choice (AOC). Non-well-founded set theory (NWFST) is necessary since I deal with interactive computation (I did not know that fact earlier!), but it appears insufficient: The computation I consider must not only be interactive but also be *unseparated*. Why? (1) Because I see Goedel's theorem as telling us that unseparable sets are creative (see my math page: Goedel numbering hid the fact Goedel was dealing with unseparable sets in his demonstration). Wegner sees that theorem as merely giving a "more powerful" computational base (as going from rational to reals for numbers) via interactive computing. I see this position as a (wishful?) misinterpretation of a very novel metamathematical theorem - which for the first time deals with unseparable sets without saying it. (2) Also because creativity for me is a feature of a set not covered by
NWFST. I see this property at the origin of (a necessity for obtaining) a
separable world because of a mix of experiments and logic: So I am still in search of a mathematics of unseparable sets. Note that in the section of Wegner's paper (section 4.2) where the MIMs model is discussed, this model appears to justify my CSM: MIM behavior is not expressible by (reducible to) SIMs. Interactions considered as transactions cannot be serialized because of the *circular* dependency of the I/O process. My conclusion: Due to this circularity, interactions form a manifold of relations, which must be common to all MIMs in order to provide the overall consistency of the computation... [SPK] Umm, I don't quite understand your thinking here. :-( Could you elaborate on how it is that the circularity (of the relations) gives a separable property? It seems to me that the opposite is the case! The consistency requirement is only a local (with in the individual I/O's) one, so I don't understand how you arrived at your conclusion. :-( [RYG] Reading the paper by Wegner has given me an idea that these manifolds must be a necessity: That paper is mentioning "vicious circles" as necessary in (if not fundamental to) interactive computations. There is also there the idea that within such an extended logic there must be an overall "consistency" for the computation. In order for that consistency to exist there must be a "reference connection" between all the "vicious circles," the "content" manifolds. Since connections between manifolds are steps of the computation part of more than one manifold, this reference can then only be a common manifold. I must say that the mentioned "vicious circles" made me jump to bounded manifolds of relations! The "infinite chains" that Peter Wegner refers to also in his paper would correspond to unbounded manifolds. These would be the "content" manifolds of my work. Then I consider *exchanges* between the content manifolds instead of the earlier common reference idea (to follow the interactive computing model), and from the circularity of such exchanges (per Peter's words which I used above) I conclude similarly that they form also a manifold: the CSM (which could be bounded or unbounded). In my mind I treat all these manifolds as Goedel treated propositions on integers, with Goedel numbers, so that I can speak about them, but they are all giving unseparable results! The fact they are unseparable is not in contradiction with me speaking about them (by implying a Goedel number for each). They all exist, very much as the "ultrareals" defined in my math page exist in a platonic sense. I attempt to follow the path of Goedel for other objects beside the integers, as for me he was the first (and only) who had a method to really deal with the unseparable. [SPK] But Roger, as you might notice the "logic" associated with NWFST is not the usually used "established" logic; NWFST is the logic of stream interactions and, unlike the Boolean logic of TMs cannot be separable into a priori given propositions/states! Your consideration of monadic relational manifolds as infinite superposed root/trees is very close to the ideas implicit in NWFST and thus I believe that we are very close in our thinking. ;-) It might help you to get a copy of Vicious Circles by Barwise and Moss [5] to get into the detail of this. [RYG] I'll look into it. But before you pointed me to Peter Wegner's work, I knew untuitively that interacting computers *each separately* did not deal with algorithmic processes. So this work is really not new to me, except for a much better definition of terms (I wish I had that work earlier so I would not have had to go through what I went through). I have dealt with Artificial Life methods before working on my thesis. I dealt specifically with the Tierra system, a well-known program, and back in 1994 I faced the key problem of why such simulations could not truly reproduce Life. Tom Ray first (before my input) followed the idea in computer science - of the early 1990s - about parallel processing, the Connection Machine. This was a manifest flop by 1994 (as the 5th generation CS project flopped). Then he went on the new idea of interactive computing, which was only an implicit concept in 1994, and attempted to put his system on the Internet as a bunch of independent "Tierra islands" exchanging with each other. This was the subject of a workshop at the Santa Fe Institute in 1995 where I argued with Tom that he still could not get Life behavior out of it, interactive computing still could not bring a "lifelike" behavior to the system, and this because you might as well have a big computer and make it internally multitasking with *streams* between the tasks. Yet the entire system was a single algorithmic machine. The non-algorithmic aspect was coming only when you took a portion of the system, one of the tasks, what is called in Physics the dichotomy observer-observed system. For one of the parts there was no doubt that it was becoming that way more "powerful" in what it could do. But the overall power of the system was not more than algorithmic. Peter Wegner emphasizes the power of the separated parts of the system on their own, and I do not disagree at all with him there. But he claims that knowing the entire system is like a God position, unaccessible to us. There I disagree: He still deals with finite equipment, our good old computers, and knowing the entire system is not impossible at all. The only way out for bringing more power is to bring *interacting humans* and their creativity on a network. The fact each part is non-algorithmic does not increase the *overall* power of the system. What was missing in the Tierra system was that *creative* ability of Life not available in machines. |
| Kantian Philosophy and the CSM
[RYG] The matter of CSM is too critical to let it at what I said earlier. It is at the base of both my "open" General Relativity and "true" QM ideas making up my work. You have also not appreciated the key scientific method point of phase 2 on that matter per your last reply. Since philosophy is decidedly your inclination, here is more on a philosophical standpoint. You implied that "Normal" space is a "virtual reality" generated by the QC's in an interactive way and does not have an existence on its own. I fundamentally disagree. You are caught in the sophism of Kantian philosophy. Here I quote Weyl's Space Time Matter book[4], p. 3:
"Kant was the first to take the next decisive step towards the point of view that not only the qualities revealed by the senses, but also space and spatial characteristics have no objective significance in the absolute sense; in other words, that space too is only a form of our perception. In the realm of physics it is perhaps only the theory of relativity which has made it quite clear that the two essences, space and time, entering into our intuition have no place in the world constructed by mathematical physics."For me this shows why our present mathematical physics is inadequate! It has in effect formalized a philosophical system, not our world. Space HAS an objective significance. Why? Because it is built out of its content, per Leibniz. The kantian philosophy goes fundamentally against the leibnizian philosophy, and Einstein late in his life started to realize that fact. This is the key fallacy in our present theories, both relativity and QM. I see now why it is so difficult for you and others (such as Cagle) to consider a CSM, a unique entity made out of monadic relations (something hard to visualize but which is relativistic in nature since monadic relations are "speed of light" things) which does not depend on "observers" for its existence. The fictitious breakdown of our world into observers and observed is the problem modern physics is facing. All observers are part of the content of space, which builds and maintains that CSM. Space does not exist by itself, that does not make it "unobjective!" A pile of rocks makes a mountain, that does not make the mountain "unobjective," it does exist! When you assume a separation observer-observed this is when you create fallacies in the kantian vein. Descartes' dualism is the first philosophy which created the notion of observer, and for a good reason: We are true QCs, a part of the world with its own holistic makeup, a universe within the universe, very much as nuclei of atoms are universes within our universe. We get to interface the universe at large, and there is the key of your physically undefined generic and formal QM observer fallacy: Unlike other classical or QM complex objects, including your QM observers, our classical impressions come from quantum states in our microtubular arrays affected by that universe. Such states are persistent in time, thus we get only a finite or countable part of our universe at any time! The continuum of the universe is not accessible to us, even though we are unseparable entities of cardinality higher than the continuum. We appear to think in finite or countable ways because we use the classical records (persistent states) in our MT arrays to think aloud - to put it in language form! (While internally our true thinking - quantum computation - is unaccessible to our awareness since this demands separability of concepts.) So here I will stand alone: The CSM is an unique monadic entity as objective as any nucleus of atom existing outside and in spite of all the "observers" we can dream of, classical or quantum. [SPK] This is the crux of our disagreement and I will argue my case based upon what you are both saying what what I infer that you are implying. ;-) I will seem a bit harsh but please understand that I would want the same treatment for the same behavior! [RYG] I am glad I hit at last upon the key of the disagreement. I can see below where statements by others have been put out of their original context to satisfy their own views. This is typical of philosophical debates. I welcome the opportunity to redress the steering back to its original road, as we definitely went astray sometimes on the road to Alice in Wonderland between Leibniz and now. [SPK] Let us review what Leibniz said: "As for me, I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time; space being an order of coexistence as time is an order of successions."Leibniz (1696, 1714) quoted by Lee Smolin in his paper "Space and Time in the Quantum Universe" (a paper which you might like to read!) This statement is not necessarily in contradiction with the thoughts of Kant at all! [RYG] Leibniz had a problem expressing his very deep view of the world, there is no doubt about that, and the remark above was after seeing comments by others about his Monadology. In fact it is such statements that led to kantian views one century later. I will not here go on analyzing Leibniz in general, I am not a philosophy professor. However, I read in Leibniz an understanding totally different from the one Smolin and you have, a view that succeeded to overcome Leibniz's in the 20th century through the success of Einstein's breakthrough. Without going into a lengthy analysis, on the face of the sentence above you have to note that relativity is identified in the "coexistence" of unmentioned monads, not in the objects or "observers" we see on the classical plane. Monads cannot be seen (see the Monadology), they are creating the content of space as well as creating that space via their "coexistence," thus this created common entity can only be relative to the monads! You are plugging the notion of "observer" regardless of the intent of the words above, but this notion does not belong there at all. What people such as Weyl failed to see in Einstein's work is that space was for the first time manipulated by its own content, it was "relative" to its content... Weyl saw only the special relativity part, the one coming from the monadic relations making space at the speed of light. This has been a common mistake through the 20th century: There are two parts in the Relativity theory, with "relativity" being only one part! (Einstein himself had misgivings about that title from the beginning.) I see the second part as the one addressed by Leibniz, the relativity of the structure of space vs its content, its "order of co-existence"! [SPK] All that is required to see how Kant's and Leibniz's thoughts combine is to consider the "fact" that more than one observer, and thus more than one set of perceptions, exist! [RYG] That's where your car is going straight to the ditch! The slight opening given by Leibniz has grown to the worst heresy, thanks to Kant and the misreadings by Weyl and many others, leading to our present Alice in Wonderland physics. This has been so common in the past of Man's understanding of the world. [SPK] Together I take these two ideas to say: *For every observer* there exists an order of coexistence of that which such observes and an order of successions. [RYG] You can say a lot of things once you accept sophisms ("observers"), but they will lead you nowhere, unfortunately. We must go back to where the notion of "observer" came from: Descartes! [SPK] What this has to do with a "world constructed by mathematical physics" other than the obvious fact that such is a mere model of the world and not be be mistaken for "the world" itself, but many fail to do so. :-( [RYG] Ho no! Our theories attempt to describe our world, they are not merely "models" as Kuhn wanted you to believe (as Galileo's pope said too) in order to put down Science! They may be incomplete or a simplification of Reality, but they are not a fantasy; unlike other stories in the lore of Humanity they do tell us something true about our world. I appointed myself to redress the steering of the car back to before it went into the ditch, and as a result make our theories fit our world a lot better, as it was originally thought before kantian philosophy took over. My next two sentences below fit this point perfectly. [SPK] (Quoting RYG) "For me this shows why our present mathematical
physics is inadequate! It has in effect formalized a philosophical system,
not our world. Space HAS an objective significance. Why? Because it is
built out of its content, per Leibniz. The kantian philosophy goes
fundamentally against the leibnizian philosophy, and Einstein late in his
life started to realize that fact. This is the key fallacy in our present
theories, both relativity and QM." [RYG] I talked with Smolin about a year ago, I mentioned my site to him and he may have taken my ideas seriously since then... He was not talking about monads back then! Back then he was failing to see the mountain in front of him, he still was thinking of dark matter as a great discovery, not questioning at all if this was matter at all! As many others he was missing an overall view, and this, I believe, because he is in the Establishment environment, not an outsider. He CAN'T throw out the thinkings of the Establishment. A great rethinking must be done in order to redirect that car, and such can't come from within that Establishment, it would be too dangerous for it! [SPK] But, back to the point, what the "so-called" objective significance of space and time is *NOT* that there is a 4d cube "out there" that we are just "world tubes" in! NO! We both agree that space (and time) are constructions that emerge from QC, ... [RYG] For me they emerge from monadic computation outside of ANY observer! [SPK] ...but it seems that you are missing a key notion that is also
involved and that is Simply put there is no way at all to consider the concurrency of events to "exist prior to the execution of the events themselves." [RYG] This states the fallacy of conceiving the CSM as an entity in the classical way of conceiving entities (such as computer networks). The "creativity" of the monads by being unseparable produces such a feature of their evolution, a space! There is simply no time at the level of the monads! A fortiori "concurrency of events" is meaningless on that plane. Remember the lightning strikes and the train story in Relativity... The CSM is unlike other quantum structures, and unless you have a "true" Quantum Theory you cannot apply ANY of the present QM formalism to deduce anything about the CSM or the appearance of a local time! That's for point (1) above. For points (2) I feel it is irrelevant because we are not dealing with classical computation, and (3) if I am with Plato, this is first news to me...The CSM is a dynamic entity like the nucleus of an atom. [SPK] To say that the CSM is independent and separate from all other monadic relations also requires it to have an order of coexistence and succession that is "pre-computed" ab initio. [RYG] I never said that the CSM was such! The CSM is "maintained" by the content, without a sense of time (here I complete Leibniz's thinking: The order of succession does not mean time is created! Relations at the speed of light are tricky!). We simply have to give up on the notion of concurrency at the monadic relations level. I know that this is hard to swallow but the train story was also hard to swallow. [SPK] [Continued from above] This is the same fallacy that Barbour's idea (explained in his book The End Of Time [6]) suffers from. :-( . Leibniz himself had this problem and introduced the ad hoc notion of a "pre-existing harmony" to explain it away, but such a notion is dependent on the existence of an entity (God) for its generation and maintenance. If we are going to introduce such notions into our model we must not dare call them science! [RYG] Hah! Here Leibniz faced the key understanding that time does not exist at the monadic level and of course he could not see how to go beyond that with his finite monads. Bruno was well in advance of him, and needless to say, he did not need a god to find the answer (maybe that's why he was burned at the stake). He saw the notion of "wholeness," that monads are infinite elements and harmony is a sought-after principle of the monads (the Groupish Monad Principle of my phase 2), not something given from the "outside." We seek that when we go dancing, as our ancestors the spirochetes did in their collective undulating ways. I WILL dare call that notion science! The problem you are identifying comes from the inadequacy of the present QM formalism. My phase 2 gives an example of how this principle operates (not its formalism of course - I doubt it can be formalized though). [SPK] (Quoting RYG) "I see now why it is so difficult for you and
others (such as Cagle) to consider a CSM, a unique entity made out of
monadic relations (something hard to visualize but which is relativistic
in nature since monadic relations are "speed of light" things) which does
not depend on "observers" for its existence. The *fictitious* breakdown of
our world into observers and observed is the problem modern physics is
facing. " [RYG] The "fictitious" comes when the notion of "observer" is being extended from the original Descartes' notion to other things than QCs (human and animal brains). There is a definite interface between QCs and reality at large, not so with other entities such as rocks. All the sudden the world is being built by (human) observers! But Mars exists without observers (we don't create that planet by looking at it with our telescopes... Galileo's pope believed that!) QCs (universes within a universe) are very rare in our world, and it is plain silly to base that infinite world out there on our petty existence! [SPK] [Continued from above] And also, what in the world does the "speed of light" mean outside of a classical context? It is merely a null mapping function between the observations of observers. [RYG] I use that term because there is no other term for objects which have no time, object eternal by definition. The lack of proper term is indicative of how strange to our classical experience such entities are. Let's expand our imagination, please! [SPK] I am arguing that we have a "common world" because each of us, as QC systems have similar (bisimilar actually!) observations, not because there is some CSM "out there." [RYG] Fine, but that does not change the fact the world out there exists without us (and the space that comes with it), and our physical theories want to address that world, not the world only experienced by humans. That's why using the notion of "observer" to study that world in general is fictitious. [SPK] We must remember that monads incorporate both the observer and the observed thereby together simultaneously and thus explicitly manifest the unseparateness of the two from each other. [RYG] That's your view! If you want to introduce a notion manifestly not applying to the monadic world, fine (see your inapplicable definition later on). But I don't see this path going anywhere. [SPK] When I imply that the CSM would have to be depend on the observations of QC observers I have come to such a conclusion only after careful consideration! The main problem with your Objective CSM idea that I see is that it is an attempt to reintroduce an Absolute into Leibniz's monadology that is not allowed by the very way that monads are defined. Monads are the only entities that exist and are such that they reflect each other and if there exist a monad that was "different" from all others, like your CSM, then the definition of monads falls apart! [RYG] That's your key point, and the failure of Leibniz on that matter is evident. Bruno had a much more wholesome notion in mind. We saw earlier Leibniz's failure with "harmony", Bruno saw sound and music as a metaphor for that "wholeness" of monads. The mystery of harmony which we find in listening to music is the *act of creation*, the very thing that physics to-date misses in its theories. The CSM is NOT an Absolute at all, it is a monadic dynamical structure like a photon or an electron. I never heard a photon as being an Absolute, yet it does have non-local effects, as in EPR or its wave aspect, outside time and space, effects described by a formalism but with no ontology in present QM! My approach says that part of the CSM is absorbed in AGNs and is developed in galactic radiative emissions, it IS a quantum dynamic entity, and it is as real as fire! It is not a "different monad," it is the part of the monadic world that provides a reference to all the other monadic evolutions which include photons, electrons, etc. It is not an orchestra director mind you. It just happens to represent the unity of the world, exactly what Mach saw in his Principle. But it is much more than Mach dreamed of. The "emptiness of space" first seen by Newton is a fallacy of the first magnitude, and no 20th century "vacuum/zero point energy" concept can make do for it. [SPK] Either the CSM is an attribute of every monad or monads do not exist. You can't have your cake and eat it too! [RYG] Well, I can...The CSM is only one of the structures of the monadic world (not a platonic form!). It can change into other structures, matter or radiation in AGNs (via sinks of space instead of black holes) or come from radiation turning into space (Hubble effect). You may want to look at Conway's Game of Life and see how via a few local rules so many structures will appear. Except that monads do not follow local rules (there is no such thing as locality in the monadic world), they are global rule automata (see one of my appendices of phase 2). Monads are all the same, but the global rules of the computation are there to define their groupings and separatings, all without time defined. One of the global rules is that they must be part of an assembly connected to the CSM. There is no such thing as an "isolated" monad. Other rules are there, such as the Harmony Rule (see earlier) but without a mathematics of the unseparable giving me a true Quantum Theory I cannot go further there. [SPK] Please, understand that I do not mean to be harsh as it is obvious that your work is a serious thing and I value immensely what you are doing, but remember that "if you can't be wrong then you can't possibly be right!" [RYG] Well, you may want to look at your position there...This question of who is right is why I stand falsifiable with the experiments I propose in 3 separate fields of science! You already said you are not falsifiable, and no amount of philosophizing will help there, in this discussion we are not using formal statements, only thoughts. There is no way to know who is right without experimenting (a small reminder that you may be too close to Galileo's pope there in your position by believing you can find what is right from what is wrong by a pure thought process - this is where I have nothing to do with Plato or Aristotle!). [SPK] (Quoting RYG) "When you create a separation observer-observed
this is when you create fallacies in the kantian vein. " [RYG] The definition of observer you give later on can't apply to monads! So you are not avoiding anything, your car has crashed long ago. [SPK] You may wish to take a look at the work od Spinoza and see how he adds to this idea! One of the people that I am collaborating with (Lance Fletcher) is an expert in Spinoza and Leibniz and we have been talking about this stuff for a long time... [RYG] I know of Spinoza a bit too. Bruno was earlier, Spinoza heard of Bruno, but he really never grasped the thrust of Bruno's message, the main fear of Galileo's pope. So these ideas have been around for a long time. And still after so many centuries we don't know who is right! All what we know (and this from experiments and observations) is that our theories still don't muster the full nature of our world! I only hope to help a little, as I have not given up on the future of Science, as you appear to have in a covered way. [SPK] (Quoting RYG) "Descartes' dualism is the first philosophy which
created the notion of observer, and for a good reason: We are true QCs, a
part of the world with its own holistic makeup, a universe within the
universe, very much as nuclei of atoms are universes within our universe.
We get to interface the universe at large, and there is the key of your
physically undefined generic and formal QM observer fallacy: Unlike
other classical or QM complex objects, including your QM observers, our
classical impressions come from quantum states in our microtubular arrays
affected by that universe. Such states are persistent in
time, thus we get only a finite or countable part of our universe
at any time! The continuum of the universe is not accessible to us, even
though we are unseparable entities of cardinality higher than the
continuum. We appear to think in finite or countable ways because
we use the classical records (persistent states) in our MT arrays to think
aloud - to put it in language form!" [HK] The root of this restriction is from our language. QM systems are described by our language at the final level or step. The language has only a countable number of sentences. (Because the sentences consist of a finite number of alphabets (or characters). The set of such things is of countable even if we potentially have a countably infinite symbols available. This is the point I answered to you on the list.) That only finite observations are possible comes from the fact that we can form only a finite number of sentences within our life. [SPK] This is something that I see as having an answer in a study of the computational aspect of observation and communication! We see that in computational systems with finite resources of memory and/or potential energy (to actually "run the machine"), there is a limitation on the ability of one computational system to simulated the behavior of an arbitrary other computational system, assuming that there exist a priori an infinite number of different computational systems. I am proposing this (bisimulation) notion as a way to explain why we get this restriction that you see as coming from our language. I agree with you, but I am trying to think of this as applying to any QM system, not just "us humans". ;-) [HK] If we could use QM language to express things, then we (observers) could describe things of the cardinality of continuum, as the number of bases of QM state space is of continuum as I explained above. But actually we speak classical language, with which we express QM logic and so on. This is the cause that we have to have two aspects of the world, one is QM and another is classical. The QM aspect is unobservable in this sense that we cannot express it by our language (what we can express on QM is just the structure of QM theory, not QM facts by our language). Classical aspect is the world of things we can express by our language, then these are real for us in the point that we can communicate these classical facts by our language to others, whereas QM facts cannot be communicated by our countable language except for expressing the structure of what we assign to the imaginary QM world. [SPK] I would point out that the continuum nature of the state space forbids the ability to discriminate "this" from "not-this" that is a key aspect of classical communication. Recall the ambiguous definition of information: "Information is the ability to choose reliably between alternatives"... I have been making the argument that the Classical aspect of our commonly perceived world is something that "emerges" from the never-ending process of "clocking". [HK] Thus QM aspect and classical aspect are the consequence of the restriction of our language. What we express is done by our words, thus this distinction is real for us. No other restriction is here. This is just a consequence of human's restriction. What we are considering or our problem in science is how and what we (humans) can express about the world. Then it is natural that ourselves give the world that distinction or give it the division into two aspects, QM and classical. No imaginary ability can resolves this division. [SPK] I agree. We can also see that this implies that the Cartesian Cut between the two worlds is not an external absolute but is a subjective distinction. I propose that there is something missing in the usual thought regarding this issue and it is the important role that is played by the fact that our actual observations of "the world" as individuals are not merely given by the spectrum of possible (a priori) observations, but also involve, at least tacitly, the possibility of confirmation and communication by and with each other. In other words, I believe that the restriction and/or selection of certain observations that we actually have has something to do with the way that we communicate with each other regarding our individual observations. Does this make sense so far? [HK] Yes, surely. Your are saying here the same thing as what I have
said
above. [RYG] Hitoshi acknowledges we (as QCs) are limited to the language to communicate but he has no idea why we are so! So his explaination has no basis. Further he has no answer when you attempt to find a generalization to non-human QM systems so the classical world could be explained outside our existence that way. My phase 2 attempts to give an answer as I described earlier for humans (true QCs). This is where our approaches are very different: I look at what could make a true QC with physical systems, while you and Kitada remain in formal systems with no attempt to get to the physical layouts that could realize the functions you attempt to logically identify. For me your way is not the way to advance Science and the classical world does exist outside of us, we can prove this via experiments, not philosophy. [SPK] (Quoting RYG) "...(While internally our true thinking - quantum
computation - is unaccessible to our awareness since this demands
separability of concepts.)" [RYG] If you argue that our self-awareness comes from "sufficient complexity" you are in the same bag as the Artificial Life people, or Prigogine and his autopoeitic whorls, no better than the phlogiston idea. I am attempting to go a little beyond that dark age alchemistry in my phase 2. [SPK] I would tentatively say that to define an observer all that is required is for there to exist a quantum entanglement of its decomposable "parts" that allow for the existence of a collection of probabilities and a unitary transform that can transform anyone of them into any other. This would apply to a single electron as well as to a galaxy! [RYG] That's a mathematical description with no physical meaning! I am still waiting for a definition of "observer" which makes sense (this was the big failure of all the versions of QM). The only observers I know are the ones who deal with persistent quantum states (we humans and animals), the only kind which appears to have been considered by Descartes. [SPK] (Quoting RYG) "So here I will stand alone: The CSM is an
objective entity (such a a photon or an atomic nucleus) existing outside
and in spite of all the "observers" we can dream of." [RYG] Well, maybe I will say Thanks... I can see that the non-realists (sophists?) a la Kant, with whom you obviously belong, despite their philosophical triumph in the latter part of the 20th century thanks to the teachings of Mach, Bohr and Kuhn, have not gone very far in advancing our physical theories. To their credit though they generated a lot of words and formulas in the past 50 years, including a new ptolemaic theory. [A subsequent phone conversation reemphasized the dynamic aspect of the CSM as any other quantum structure and the inexistence of time in the monadic plane, somewhat in the line of Barbour, but not in any manner related since Barbour does not give a physical origin of time as found in the classical world, his "nature creates the impression of time" is in line with SPK's kantian philosophy about space! They may need to be both pinched and see if they think it is only an impression...] |
| A Final Dismissal
{RYG] I am now at last acquainted with a few papers dealing with Chu space. Unfortunately, as I was suspecting all along, and as it happened with the interactive computation theory, this model/formalism cannot deal with the fact that QM is fundamentally non-local as EPR experiments have proved many times. Here I quote Pratt's paper "Chu Spaces: Automata with Quantum Aspects," p.6. In response to quantum entanglements found in QM and not obtainable via the Chu space formalism, Pratt says: "This [QM formalism] leads to seemingly paradoxical faster-than-light correlations between spins of formerly associated particles, violating the Bell Inequalities and confusing even such luminaries as Einstein." This text outright advances that it is not Chu Space theory which is inadequate but QM which is not right! Sorry, but experiments prove Pratt wrong! Below in the text on that page Pratt is looking for classical
chaos theory to rescue Chu spaces from their inadequacy for
application to QM in quantum entanglement! Finally, I could not believe my
eyes when I read at the end of that page: This has turned me off entirely with this line of formalism. Its use with Descartes' dualism is also contrived due to this inability to handle the non-local aspect of QM. In fact this non-local aspect is also telling us that the concept of observer is incorrect: An observer must be able to be non-local, and classical theory as well as QM consider only local observers. The EPR experiment, as I describe in several places, involves a non-local measuring instrument to observe a single quantum phenomenon, thus uses a non-local "observer." I had to insist on the term "non-local" when I told you the pineal gland had to be replaced by a non-local interface... Chu spaces did not tell you that. Since Chu spaces can't handle non-local phenomena it is useless to cover QM, period. So far the only theory you told me about which appears to have maybe some use in further development of my theory is Kitada's Quantum Observer. But here again I am not sure it is adequate for the same reason... Whoever follows that idea must see how physically such an observer needs to be built, as it must be non-local! My description in phase 2 describes such an observer, and emphasizes that point for future experiments. [SPK] Umm, oh well... I don't read Pratt's papers in same way, I see Chu spaces only as a possible formal language to make sense of QM. We still have to hash out some issues, but we don't need to deal with Chu spaces, [RYG] Reading that page I quoted as well as other papers leaves no doubt. Wishful thinking is very common in areas which need props in order to get grants... [SPK] [Continued from above] but, on the other hand, I think that you should re-evaluate your thinking about computation! There are both space-like and time-like aspects that you seem to dismiss. I recommend that you read up on the concurrency problem in distributed computation... [RYG] I did, and this confirms that such a theory can't hack the non-local effects of QM also. In his paper "Why Interaction Is More Powerful Than Algorithms" Wegner says on p.11 "Penrose's argument that physical systems are subject to elusive noncomputable laws yet to be discovered is wrong, since interaction is sufficiently expressive to describe physical phenomena like action at a distance, nondeterminism, and chaos [9], which Penrose cites as examples of physical behavior not expressible by computers." Ref. 9 is his paper "Interactive Foundations of Computing" and I went through that paper, mentioning concurrency and all that stuff, but nowhere there is an attempt to connect to non-local physical effects. Wegner can't! A computer network has no sense of "space," Cyberspace is not a space! Until computers contain physical elements that use QM non-local effects, they can't say they have the power of non-local effects. My work refers to a number of rather recent experiments that show the brain acting in a real QM fashion, including displaying such non-local effects. (Example: recently observed cells sending long-distance cytonemes - shots - to other cells during development.) Also, I have at last looked at Hitoshi Kitada's papers and I believe I
can evaluate the thrust of his theory at this point. The idea of local
time makes indeed very much sense, and this follows my own theory.
However, I see two key problems with the way he is using the idea: His description of the EPR experiment is a symptom of the inadequacy of his views: Mainly because of (2) above, he cannot come to grip with the experimental fact that there are non-local phenomena with no theoretical limits in their range (within present QM), and that they are NOT relative to the "point-of-view" of the observer. There is simply no other "point-of-view" where EPR experiments fail. His description of the Hubble effect is also of that sort: Contrary to what he says, there is no other "point-of-view" where the effect is not physically there. I see it is as a physical objective product of the existence of space (again, experiments will prove that view as correct). AGN's are too, as well as Life. I know you will want to argue on the above points. I will advance my
own theory as a rebuttal there: In my theory, the definition of "local" is consistent between time and space through their common makeup - the quantum/monads. They are both defined at the level of galaxies by being systems generated by AGN's, such as quasars (see Halton Arp's observations). An "observer" in my view could be as big as a galaxy because it would fit in the same space system and have a corresponding unique time reference (which BTW could be 3-dimensional). I have not seen experimental predictions in Kitada's work [7]. The experiments to prove my theory (in Astrophysics, besides two other very separate scientific fields) are not only the limited range of the Hubble effect that I am the only one to predict (defining our space sytem), but also the quantized redshifts from AGN products, as Arp categorized, about which I learned only recently and after my work was done! Since new time and space systems are initially computed in AGN they evolve from these initial "mini bangs," (There appears to be many kinds of them, some giving gamma ray bursts, other proton -new hydrogen - jets, and yet others spewing blobs of matter in blazars.) Time and the total energy of the generated systems must be quantized. What we see from Earth are redshifts intrinsic to such systems: The Hubble generic redshift is tied to the makeup of our own system, intrinsic redshifts are tied to other space systems, the observed systems (on top of the generic redshift which blurrs their quantized character somewhat). Finally Kitada uses existing QM (for matter only) and GR (there he can't address black holes because he assumes only small gravitational effects) without questioning them. These theories are both far from being an all-encompassing description of our world, and in my theory notably missing the fundamental concept of CSM's, which existence I hope to prove (thus not the figment of our impressions!) via Particle Physics, Astrophysics and Life experiments. Of course, unlike Kitada, I don't go via formal systems since the present systems must be discarded, and the math for the replacements needs to be invented. |