TW: As your section attempts to do, it is a worthwhile goal to distinguish different degrees and modes of consciousness, and to consider how they might differ between organisms of differing complexity, and how consciousness and awareness are related to language. Even humans have different degrees and modes of awareness at different times, e.g. in dreaming, people are not always aware they are dreaming. And it is correct that one's awareness may or may not focus on oneself, it may at times be focused on the external world or sensations, rather than on one's own thoughts, etc....

RYG: While awareness and consciousness are pretty much the same thing, awareness and self-awareness are very different capabilities: A dog can be aware of its surrounding, this does not make it able to be self-aware (an amoeba may be aware of its surrounding too as Hameroff thought!). The capability of reflecting on the self appears to be the characteristic of humans, and becomes a "degree or mode" of consciousness only when this capability is there, "built in the system" in the first place. It appears to be a physical capability that appeared very late in evolution (how late is debatable as we shall see below), and as such has an important value for an analysis of the mental phenomena physical support. I do identify focusing as another important mental function which appears to have existed early in evolution. But when focusing on one's own thought is mentioned, the physical function being discussed can only be totally different since it is there only in humans. One of the critical faux-pas I distinguish in the literature about Cognitive Psychology is the attempt to include animals with that ability by confusing it within consciousness.

TW (continuation from above): Granting all that, your paper's mention of Jaynes work appears not well executed, to the point of weakening your paper significantly. You mention Jaynes in a rather uncritical way, which leads the Reader to infer that you accept Jaynes' contention that humans were not self-aware more than 3000 years ago. (Do you really believe this?)

RYG: I really don't have an opinion on this, my belief is in suspens because what Jaynes did was taking only a few records, he was only starting on a long path which could have ultimately disproved his conclusions, or maybe not. The intent of that author was not to question consciousness versus self-awareness, but to find when self-awareness appeared. My personal speculation on that matter ranges from going back to the caveman and his shamanic paintings to the epic of Gilgamesh where I see the drama of a being seeing its brother as itself (himself?) for the first time in recorded history. But being only speculation I did not include such in my work. The science on this matter is just too young. I only want this science to start on the right foot. I do say that Jaynes' conclusions are very controversial. I do not offer an opinion on his conclusions in that section. I feel that offering such an opinion would be out of place. I mentioned the analysis by a known psychologist from Princeton (not a tabloid writer!), Jaynes, because it was the only analysis I could find in the literature besides Calvin's which does go at length identifying self-awareness but called it consciousness instead. His remarkable conclusions make the matter of differentiation of terms sharply focused, and this focusing is the merit of that work in my mind as an input to my study, not its conclusions.

I don't think the Reader of my work will see the mentioning of Jaynes' work as an endorsement, unless he/she is biased about the matter of strongly differentiating or not between humans and other animals on the capability of reflecting on the self. This work is an input to my study in the sense I describe above, that's all (but a critical one). It may hopefully wake up the Reader to the importance of the differentiation I discuss. The literature on Cognitive Psychology I read has not worked out the differentiation in my view for the casual Reader. Reading Dennett and Searle shows at least to me that there is a large lacuna within that field by not emphasizing the difference. My main concern in the section in question is only to connect self-awareness to the potential importance of the physical phenomenon behind it that evolution stumbled upon.

TW: It does not appear that you are the first to make a distinction between different modes of awareness, etc. Rather it seems that others have undoubtedly discussed this previously.

RYG: Apparently not when the "modes" are assumed applicable to organisms other than human. I know that Dennett and Searle assumed things a priori on what is consciousness for humans, while making remarks about animals under the same term. Another example I am aware of is the extensive debate on consciousness that Hameroff started several years ago now related to his website with prominent personalities. I could not find there where the meaning of consciousness was identified sharply versus self-awareness: While this last ability is an obvious human characteristic, remarks about animals are made there too, confusing the two in the animal realm! I will venture to say a priori that Hameroff being an anesthesiologist cannot tell (and can't care) about the difference, and this is why his conclusions are so different from Jaynes.

TW: In your paper you apparently do not discuss Searle's or Dennett's work in any detail, except to give brief, scattered references and to say that Dennett proposes classical systems. So then when you give a couple of paragraphs talking about "language vs. self-awareness" and "consciousness vs. self-awareness", you mention only Jaynes and Hameroff, ignoring the multitude of other authors who have written about such topics. You seem to favor Jaynes more than Hameroff. On the basis of what you say, and how you say it, one may conclude there is some dependency between your theory and Jaynes. If you are going to discuss consciousness, self-awareness, language, etc., then it should be done in much more detail, with more discussion of relevant authors.

RYG: When it comes to the "multitude of other authors who have written about such topics" I cannot find other ones in the Cognitive Psychology literature making any strong difference between consciousness and self-awareness, the subject I focus on, as this difference appears to be seldom addressed there (most likely because animals are not the subject of that field after all!). I do identify though in the section in question that others besides Jaynes are willing to tackle the issue dealing with the appearance of self-awareness under the term of "paleopsychology."

I agree though that I have not given a full discussion on the matter of self-awareness versus consciousness/awareness. At the time I wrote the section I though it was sufficient to make the connection with the physical phenomena I introduced earlier, the reason for my discussion in the first place, and frankly I thought the matter was rather obvious. I know now that it may not be for others indeed. Rereading Searle recently made me jump again on that matter. Yet I am wondering whether I need to add much more via making a lengthy analysis of Dennett and Searle, comparing their attitude with Hameroff, Calvin and Jaynes.

I mention Dennett in the "focus of attention" part, Calvin in the "coordinated sequential motility" part dealing with the origin of language (separate from self-awareness!), Jaynes for the connection language-self awareness, and Hameroff for consciousness vs. self-awareness. These references are meant to expand on the few words I use and give a feel on the different parts of mental phenomena. The matter is vast, but my synopsis appears to be all that is needed to convey the message I want to bring:

Self-awareness is VERY different from consciousness when this last term is applied to the animal world at large.

Jaynes is there in one of the links I identify, not to agree with his conclusions but to show the subject he has addressed if the Reader wants to know more on that differentiation. This appears to be very clear from the context, and I appear to treat Hameroff in the same way I treat Jaynes, using him as a contrasting view to bring out the differentiation.

TW: Even if we suppose that language is a component or pre-requisite to full human self-awareness, including awareness of one's own concepts and thoughts (which may be a very tenable view), Jaynes' claim that this goes back only 3000 years is balderdash. The Chinese language is at least 4000 years old. Ruhlen and others have studied the evolution of human languages, and find evidence that all existing human languages evolved from a smaller set of proto-languages earlier in time. There are some archeologists and geologists who find evidence the Sphinx is 10,000 years old, though this is not accepted by the majority of Egyptologists. Finally, Homo Sapiens has existed for about 100,000 years-- yet our records of human civilization go back only a few thousand years. It is a great mistake for us to presume that human language and self-awareness, and for that matter, human civilization, do not predate our records.

RYG: Maybe. But we must realize that a lot of preconceptions can be subjacent in the line of thinking above, apriorims in another word. All the above is still not a scientific study of how the mind operates versus key recognitions describing a fundamental change in the physical makeup of a mind which has made humanity, undeniably a very different set of animals because of that unique feature. You may read the epic of Gilgamesh in its most precise translation (not the versions in classical books who want to "humanify" things) and find a change in the mind process through the tragedy described, and the very way it is described. This is not a lone example found in the records. I don't say that I agree with the description Jaynes makes of them because this is not enough to decide (the study must be worldwide and he did not cover a representative sample by far). But there is much more in that area to investigate, and maybe we will never have a clearcut answer. This is why he is controversial, but let's not cover the controversy with apriorisms. The existence of language (since you mention it as an indication of self-awareness) is a feature separate from the content a language can or has been used to express.

RYG (truncated quote by TW): While awareness and consciousness are pretty much the same thing, awareness and self-awareness are very different capabilities: A dog can be aware of its surrounding, this does not make it able to be self-aware

TW: Yes. That's what I said (or tried to say) above, awareness does not necessarily mean self-awareness. There can be different degrees and modes of awareness, for different organisms. Relatively few organisms have any degree of self-awareness.

RYG: First, as I mentioned earlier, I will question the existence of "degrees" of self-awareness, as I see the organism self-aware or not, nothing in-between. But at this point there may be a start of agreement between us, because I cannot find the very last sentence above by you in the relevant literature. In the section in question I attempt to find what makes our mind physically a human mind versus other organisms' minds. That very observation you make now is for me the key to a future understanding of mental phenomena allowing a connection with the physical support of such phenomena. Then I will eliminate the other organisms due to the observed fact they don't have a language permitting to exchange thoughts, as language is a prerequisite for exchanging concepts, one of which being the concept of self. Many organisms have ways to exchange information, but a conceptual language involving the self is never there except for humans, and that's pretty much established. Again, there are no "degree" of self-awareness, it is a yes-no proposition.

(Conclusion)

RYG: I agree that I have not created an airtight story on the immense difference between consciousness and self-awareness - which differentiates Humanity from other animals - by a long shot, and this by contrasting only two authors to testify on that difference. Yet it may not be worthwhile to spend time on adding more on the subject due to the speculative aspect of this final section, and the fact this would drive phase 2 of the study out of its intent. Making a general analysis of the approaches by various authors just to describe what can be found about the differentiation in the present literature appears pointless for the intent and outcome of the thesis.

RYG: On the matter of the reply to the criticism of my mentioning the conclusions by Jaynes in the section in question, I feel I show a lot more valid commonsense than the a priori argumentation brought forth by TW. Commonsense from a priori argumentation was at the origin of the flat earth. I used a lengthy answer because any short answer would not have given a meaningful reply. I leave the evaluation of my position to the Reader's judgement. The factual arguments by TW later in the text against Jaynes conclusions have been answered by showing they do not address the issue. Jaynes does not base his conclusions on a lack of records before a certain time in history.

I really don't care when self-awareness showed up in evolution, only that its appearance made humanity (again, mentioning Jaynes' conclusions was only to show the differentiation needed between consciousness and self-awareness). The intent of the search for the origin of self-awareness in time is to find if records we do have contain information as to a change in concepts. If the concept of self exists after a time period and not before, then something can be said not only of when but that indeed such a change was drastic for the future of this group of animals, identifying the new physical capability of the system for good or bad. Of course if no clear case can be made with existing records then we may never know, and I stated as such. But let's not give up before the work is done! It just would be a lot more telling if we could see a transition in the records to pin down the drastic change. Dennett in the book mentioned below does admit on p. 154 that "they began making and using representations, but they didn't know they were doing so." Then there is a hope we indeed have records from before the transition happened.

Now back to questioning the existence of language before concepts existed: Humans may have a capability but be incapable of expressing it in records that would survive to the present day, they had natural language speech for many generations before they invented writing that could capture their speech even partially. Did they need to be self-aware to have language and writing? No, according to Dennett above, and this backs up Jaynes' thesis. A mode of expression can be found when the concept can be physically distinguished internally. I described with the mentioning of the epic of Gilgamesh the feedback, creative process between language and concepts. My contention is that when the capability of self recognition arrives it cannot take long to show up in the language in one form or another as it is too drastic of a change to not express it, and this via any means of representation, be paintings or writing, or even how you care for your dead. This can be considered a working hypothesis for a discovery process. Again, apriorisms cannot replace a scientific process. We need to find proof of this and not sit on our apriorisms ad infinitum if we want to make progress. The results may be disconcerting, but this would not be the first time in history, a round earth was also disconcerting.

The assumed "greater likelihood" that the transition to self-awareness happened eons ago, before people could record it in writing, is an a priorism, this for me because it is thereby denied a priori that the change is drastic for the individuals involved, and thus denied that it would not have been recorded as soon as writing was invented. I read further Dennett and this drastic aspect of self-awareness is the key question for him too as a philosopher. Such debate can be settled by examining the content of records. I am fighting against wishful apriorisms in the discussion above, for the Reader to judge.

Another contention is that the fact there is no such thing as a "degree" of self-awareness has been stated entirely without proof, and is debatable. I stated this fact without proof because self-awareness has been described as a capability, and no being can be partially capable of such due to the very nature of the thing. The modes of consciousness in humans include use and not use of the capability. Humans in a dreaming state may not be using that capability, this does not make them "partially self-aware." I cannot recall of a "partially self-aware" dog either. How do I know they cannot be such? Because they can't tell me about it (by closing one eye only maybe with a smile...)! If they did they certainly would have a 1 in the bit representing self-awareness capability, not half a 1, even if asleep. In Confucius' fable [1], the fish couldn't communicate but I do know what you know by comparing concepts you express with mine (we are doing that right now!). What Confucius did not know is that language is a prerequisite to communicate concepts. Hopefully, we have made some factual discoveries since Confucius.

Another apriorism: The flaw in such analyses is that written language is not a prerequisite to having concepts, and spoken natural language can be imperfect at expressing concepts people may have nonetheless. The truth, if or when found in records, may be the entire opposite: Concepts may not be a prerequisite to written language or other representations prior to the invention of writing.

The key to this, as I said earlier, is to recognize how drastic the concept of self versus other concepts is. It may be the key to the ability to have concepts, in another word to think. If you become aware of yourself you may realize you are mortal by comparison with others, and you may become paranoid about that... It is a double edge sword, very dangerous. From this reasoning I conclude that it is very unlikely that such a concept will take long to appear in the language. So examining the psychology identifiable in records, paintings, writings or archeology, may be able to decide on whether there was a transition or not.

As I mentioned, I cannot of course vouch for the entire literature on the matter. Dennett's book "Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness" is a case in point. He specifically talks about differences in degree and modes of consciousness for animals and humans, and how this may vary across different species. The second half of this more recent book builds the case of a sharp difference between consciousness and self-awareness (in its own fuzzy terminology), and thus goes a long way toward my views, but fails to use the words properly when it comes to the key possibility of a self-awareness capability appearance as a transition having made humanity. Indeed Dennett abruptly and unexpectedly shies away from going any further in that direction at the end (in order to make his book more acceptable in the face of current preconceptions?). More importantly, he fails to mention the possibility of a scientific resolution of the matter through Jaynes' approach, although he recommends the work of that author among others as a supplemental reading. This book thus confirms for me that my description in the section in question is appropriate in the face of the analyses presently available in Cognitive Psychology.

Finally, I don't care about making a general analysis about the subject of consciousness, and I believe people make a mistake talking about this matter in general beyond a certain point because terms used there are not easy to define, and people disagree about the definitions. Without common definitions, people can then easily disagree about statements involving these terms. Before we run we must learn how to walk. For this reason I limited the field I look at. I did try to give a sharp description of the concept of self in my section for self-awareness because this feature interests me as a physicist: It appears to be a prominent change in evolution, and thus a potentially traceable physical property of the system, making it interesting for the physicist of the future due to its novelty versus the rest of the physical world. I really don't deal with consciousness in general for the lack of interest it has, except for qualia which appears to be something also prominent in organisms, and which raises the question of creativity in living systems, another physical characteristic apparently not found in the non-living world.